War : Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) Chapter 04. Termination

Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) — Part 4: Termination (1814–1815)

Termination in the Napoleonic Wars was not a single event but a two-step closure: a first settlement in 1814 after the Sixth Coalition entered Paris, followed by a renewed war in 1815 (the Hundred Days) and a second, tougher settlement designed to make a recurrence less likely.

Termination timeline (12 milestones)

5 Feb 1814 — Peace talks open at Châtillon during the allied invasion of France.
7 Feb 1814 — Allies propose peace terms centered on France’s 1792 frontiers (as reported in standard reference narratives).
9 Mar 1814 — Treaty of Chaumont: Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain bind themselves to defeat Napoleon and to avoid separate peace.
30–31 Mar 1814 — Paris falls to coalition forces (end-stage of the 1814 campaign narrative).
6 Apr 1814 — Napoleon signs an unconditional abdication; terms of exile are finalized shortly after.
11 Apr 1814 — Treaty of Fontainebleau: Napoleon is assigned sovereignty of Elba with specified financial and guard arrangements.
30 May 1814 — First Treaty of Paris: France receives comparatively generous terms, retaining 1 Jan 1792 boundaries; Congress of Vienna to settle the wider map.
Sep 1814 — Congress of Vienna begins work to finalize Europe’s territorial settlement.
13 Mar 1815 — Vienna powers issue a public declaration against Napoleon after his escape from Elba.
25 Mar 1815 — Alliance concluded: major powers commit to maintain large field forces until Napoleon is removed.
9 Jun 1815 — Final Act (General Treaty) of the Congress of Vienna is signed.
20 Nov 1815 — Second Treaty of Paris: tighter frontiers, 700 million francs indemnity, and 150,000 allied occupation troops for 3–5 years.

1) The 1814 exit: why negotiations mattered as much as battles

Facts (negotiating track, 1814)

Châtillon (Feb 1814) became the central diplomatic forum while coalition armies advanced. Reference accounts emphasize that the coalition’s bargaining position hardened around rolling France back toward earlier frontiers (commonly summarized as the “1792 frontiers” formula).
The Treaty of Chaumont (9 Mar 1814) formalized coalition unity: no signatory would make a separate peace, and the alliance would continue “until Napoleon was overthrown” (Britannica’s summary).
After Paris fell, Napoleon’s abdication and the Treaty of Fontainebleau (11 Apr 1814) created a mechanism for leadership change without continuing the invasion indefinitely: Elba as a sovereign principality for Napoleon, plus an annual income of two million francs and a 400-man guard (as summarized in authoritative biographies).
The First Treaty of Paris (30 May 1814) ended war between France and major allies on “generous terms”: France retained its 1 Jan 1792 boundaries and recovered most overseas colonies (with specified exceptions), and the treaty explicitly pointed the remaining European rearrangement to a general congress at Vienna.

Interpretations (attributed, with confidence)

Interpretation: The coalition’s relative generosity in 1814 is often explained in standard reference works as a political choice to stabilize post-Napoleonic France under the restored Bourbons rather than to dismantle France as a great power. This interpretation aligns with the treaty’s limited territorial rollback in 1814 and the explicit deferral of broader issues to Vienna. Confidence: Medium (because “why” is inferred from outcomes and contemporaneous diplomatic framing, not uniquely provable).

2) Vienna: settlement design and intra-coalition bargaining

Facts (Vienna’s agenda and outcomes)

The Congress of Vienna was tasked with converting a battlefield coalition into a durable European order. Britannica’s “Decisions” summary highlights:

Major friction points: Poland and Saxony, competing claims among Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, and the borders of the German states.
A notable moment of distrust: Austria, France, and England concluded a secret defensive alliance (3 Jan 1815) amid the Poland–Saxony dispute.
Key territorial arrangements included: a Polish kingdom under Russian sovereignty (with Austria and Prussia compensated in specified ways), Prussia’s partial acquisition of Saxony and new western territories, the strengthening of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (including Belgium), and Austrian control of Lombardy–Venetia.
The Final Act / General Treaty was signed 9 Jun 1815, consolidating the congress’s main instruments into a single framework.

Interpretations (attributed, with confidence)

Interpretation: Many historians describe Vienna as a balance-of-power settlement aimed at preventing a single-state domination of the continent; Britannica’s own framing emphasizes reinforcing buffers (e.g., the Netherlands and Prussian Rhine territories) and codifying a postwar territorial status quo. Confidence: Medium–High (the “balance” goal is widely asserted, but specifics varied by power and by issue-area).

3) The Hundred Days: why the first peace unraveled

Facts (1815 rupture and coalition response)

Napoleon returned from Elba and re-entered Paris in March 1815; Britannica’s Hundred Days overview notes that Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia concluded an alliance on 25 March and drove events toward Waterloo.
The Vienna powers issued a declaration on 13 March 1815, publicly committing themselves against Napoleon; the text is preserved in major documentary collections and parliamentary records.
Britannica’s Waterloo entry summarizes the coalition’s operational commitment: each major power vowed to keep 150,000 men in the field until Napoleon had been overthrown.

Interpretations (attributed, with confidence)

Interpretation: The Hundred Days can be read as a stress test showing that the 1814 arrangements handled a leadership transition but did not eliminate the perceived strategic risk among the great powers—hence the much harsher 1815 terms and the move toward a standing consultative alliance system. Confidence: Medium (this connects institutional changes in 1815–18 to the shock of 1815, which is plausible and commonly argued, but still interpretive).

4) The 1815 closure: second peace, tougher constraints, and enforcement

Facts (Treaty terms and immediate enforcement)

The Second Treaty of Paris (20 Nov 1815) is explicitly described as being signed “in an altogether different spirit” from the first: France’s frontier shifted back from the 1792 line to 1 Jan 1790, France paid 700,000,000 francs, and it supported an allied occupation army of 150,000 troops for three to five years.
Quadruple Alliance (conventionally dated 20 Nov 1815): Britannica describes it as renewed to prevent recurrence of French aggression and, crucially, to provide “machinery to enforce” the Vienna settlement—an early form of structured great-power consultation, including agreed troop commitments and periodic meetings.
By 1818, the occupation enforcement phase began to unwind: at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, France offered accelerated indemnity payments in exchange for withdrawal of occupation forces by 30 Nov; the offer was accepted, and France joined the powers’ deliberations, forming a Quintuple Alliance in effect.

Interpretations (attributed, with confidence)

Interpretation: Britannica’s characterization of the Quadruple Alliance as “machinery” and its linkage to recurring congresses supports an interpretation of 1815–18 as a shift from ad hoc coalitions toward rule-and-conference governance among great powers (“Congress System”). Confidence: High for the institutional shift (documented meetings and treaties), Medium for claims about intent beyond what is written.
Interpretation: Later descriptions of the Concert of Europe treat it as a “vague consensus” favoring territorial/political status quo and a claimed right of collective intervention against certain internal upheavals—suggesting that enforcement was not only about France, but also about maintaining the wider 1815 order. Confidence: Medium (the concept is real and documented; its coherence and consistency varied over time).

5) Victory criteria vs results (stated commitments versus outcomes)

Facts (criteria that were explicitly stated)

Coalition unity and no separate peace (1814): Chaumont bound the principal powers to continue until Napoleon was removed and not to negotiate separately.
Coalition force commitments (1815): March 1815 alliance planning included maintaining very large field forces until Napoleon was overthrown.
Outcome (1814): France retains 1792 boundaries; broader territorial issues deferred to Vienna.
Outcome (1815): France pushed back to 1790 frontier; indemnity + occupation; alliance “machinery” established to enforce the settlement.

Interpretation (carefully framed)

Interpretation: Measured against the coalition’s explicit criteria—removing Napoleon and preventing a rapid recurrence—1815 achieved a more robust enforcement posture than 1814 (occupation + indemnity + consultative alliance). However, the readmission of France into great-power consultation by 1818 also indicates that the settlement aimed to reintegrate France once compliance and payments were secured. Confidence: Medium–High (because the enforcement steps and 1818 reintegration are directly documented).

What is well-established vs what is disputed

Well-established (high confidence)

Two peace settlements: First Treaty of Paris (30 May 1814) and Second Treaty of Paris (20 Nov 1815).
1814 terms: France kept 1 Jan 1792 boundaries and most colonies; Vienna was tasked with the broader settlement.
1815 terms: 1790 frontier, 700 million francs, 150,000 occupation troops for 3–5 years.
Vienna’s major bargaining crisis over Poland/Saxony and the 3 Jan 1815 secret defensive alliance among Austria/France/England.
Quadruple Alliance’s role in enforcing the Vienna settlement and the practice of periodic congresses.

Disputed / interpretively uncertain (with confidence levels)

Why the allies were “generous” in 1814 (stabilization strategy vs contingent bargaining vs war-weariness). Confidence: Medium.
Why Châtillon failed (who made the decisive bargaining missteps; how credible the offers were). Confidence: Medium (often reconstructed from diplomatic memoirs and correspondence beyond summary references).
How close Vienna came to a great-power war in early 1815 (Poland–Saxony crisis severity is agreed; counterfactual escalation is debated). Confidence: Medium.
The coherence of the “Concert of Europe” as a system (clear as a concept; uneven as practice). Confidence: Medium.
Whether 1815 was primarily “containment of France” or “containment of revolution/instability” (both appear in later practice; relative weight differs across historians). Confidence: Low–Medium (requires broader evidentiary base).

Key Sources Used

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Treaties of Paris (1814–1815) (terms; borders; indemnity; occupation).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Treaty of Chaumont (1814) (no separate peace; coalition unity).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Congress of Vienna — Decisions (Poland/Saxony; secret treaty; territorial outcomes).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Napoleon I — Downfall and abdication (Elba; 2 million francs; 400 guard).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Hundred Days and Battle of Waterloo (March 1815 alliance; 150,000 commitment; pathway to Waterloo).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Quadruple Alliance (1813–1815) (enforcement “machinery”; congresses; later inclusion of France).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) (occupation withdrawal bargain; France admitted to Quintuple Alliance).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Concert of Europe (status quo concept; claimed intervention role).
Declaration at the Congress of Vienna (13 March 1815) (primary text reproduction).

Open Questions / Uncertainties (for Part 5 follow-through)

How did the financial burden of the 1815 indemnity and occupation interact with French domestic politics in 1815–1820?
To what extent did the Vienna settlement reduce interstate war risk versus shifting conflict into internal revolts and interventions under the “Concert” logic?
How decisive was great-power consultation (Quadruple/Quintuple practice) compared to simple exhaustion and deterrence in sustaining post-1815 stability?
Which parts of Vienna’s settlement were most “locked in” by treaties versus most contingent on continued cooperation (and thus more fragile)?